This paper studies three different mixing mechanisms for creating negotiation strategies out of single tactics. It shows that a mechanism introduced by Faratin et al [5] can result in a non-monotonic behaviour in a negotiation strategy in some scenarios where the time-and behavior-dependent tactics are mixed. In single issue negotiations this behaviour seems irrational and the paper proposes an additional simple constraint to solve that problem. Moreover two new mixing mechanisms are introduced and discussed: one based on individual negotiation threads of all imitative tactics and one based on single concessions. Results of an experiment demonstrate that the two new methods gain on average higher utilities than the constrained original method but at the same time can increase the risk to fail negotiation in some scenarios.
Introduction
In modern autonomous software systems, negotiation between software agents is key to facilitate decision-making between two or more parties which are in conflict about their goals. The agents have only partial and uncertain knowledge about opponents behaviour and can use a range of different strategies in various settings to conduct negotiation. Even though each party has the preference to achieve the highest possible utility from an outcome the common interest is to find an agreement until a certain deadline is reached. For example, in bilateral, single-issue negotiations, two agents exchange offers and counteroffers alternatively to bargain for a certain service or product. Every agent has a negotiation interval, defined by its initial and reservation value, where the former represents the first offer made by an agent and the latter determines the maximum (or minimum for the seller) to which the agent is willing to make concessions. Agreements can only be reached if partner's negotiation intervals overlap, hence this range defines the set of all possible outcomes. Based on the serviceoriented negotiation model by Faratin et al [5] agents can use a number of tactics from different families to negotiate such as time-or behaviour-dependent tactics. In addition, the concept of strategies is introduced where, based on a linear weighted combination of single tactics, the tactics are mixed together. However, the method can expose non-monotonic behaviour of negotiation strategies in some cases where time-and behaviour-dependent tactics are used. This introduces irrational behaviour to agents where concession curves are expected to be monotonic, especially in single-issue bargaining situations. This paper investigates this mixing mechanism and discusses scenarios where this behaviour can occur. Two new mechanisms for the creation of strategies are introduced and discussed, one based on individual negotiation threads of behaviour-dependent tactics and one based on concessions. In the next section, negotiation tactics from the service-oriented negotiation model [4] are briefly described. Section 3 presents the concept of mixed strategies and discusses the three different mixing mechanisms. An experiment illustrates the performance for each of them in section 4 and Section 5 discusses related work. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper and describes future work.
Negotiation Tactics
We use concepts of the service-oriented negotiation model introduced by Faratin et al [5, 4] . Each negotiating party has a scoring function V a : [min a , max a ] → [0, 1] assigning a score to the value of the issue under negotiation within its acceptable interval. Utility values of each party are given by their utility functions, which can be composed of the scoring and other functions such as discounts or negotiation costs. The sequence of all offers exchanged until a time n is called the negotiation thread:
for t 1 , t 2 , . . . ≤ t n . Negotiation ends when one agent accepts the last offer, reaches its deadline or withdraws from the negotiation before. Three families of negotiation tactics are used in this model: Time-dependent tactics generate offers based on the current time in the encounter and the deadline of the agent. These tactics are completely independent of the opponent's behaviour whereas monotonic decision functions such as exponential or polynomial functions are used to propose the counteroffer. We denote tactics of this family with τ time (t).
Resource-dependent tactics make proposals based on the amount of available resources, e.g. number of negotiating agents. Since time-dependent tactics are a particular type of resource-dependent tactics, we will not consider tactics of this family in this paper.
Behaviour-dependent tactics imitate the opponent's behaviour to some degree. We denote tactics of this family with τ beh (X tn a↔b ) where the negotiation thread X tn a↔b indicates that functions of this type use the agent's last offer and any number of opponent's offers from the history of the negotiation to calculate the next offer.
Strategies
The aim of strategies is to determine the best course of action which reaches an agreement and maximizes utility at the same time [4] . Different combinations of tactics can be used to generate a counteroffer if opponent's current offer is unsatisfactory. Faratin et al [5] introduces the concept of strategies where tactics are mixed based on a weight matrix:
w ji = 1 and i, j denoting the tactic and issue respectively. Each row in the matrix represents a weighted linear combination of m tactics for one issue. The weighted counterproposal extends the current negotiation thread by appending x tn+1 a→b . Different types of negotiation behaviour can be obtained by weighting a given set of tactics in different ways. Depending on the current environment and belief system of the agent, the agent's mental state can change and generate a new weight matrix.
To enable thorough discussion about mixed strategies we consider the simple case where one time-dependent and one imitative tactic is mixed for one issue. Hence, the weight matrix reduces to one weight only where 1 stands for full time dependence and 0 for full behaviour dependence, and any value in between represents a mixed strategy. We assume furthermore that the weight does not change during the encounter. Our resulting mixed strategy can be therefore reduced to: Figure 1 illustrates two negotiation examples where the buyer agent applies this mixing method. In example (a), the seller makes large first concessions and the buyer's behaviour sticks to the more boulware time-dependent tactic in the mixed strategy. This seems counterintuitive since both tactics are weighted almost equally, so that buyer's concession curve should be more imitative, i.e. rather increasing than decreasing after first concessions. Due to the imitative part of the strategy using the last offer of the mixed strategy instead of the one proposed by the pure imitative tactic for calculation, the next offer can be smaller than the previous one, especially in the case of small offers generated by the time-dependent part and the opponent reducing concessions rapidly. In addition, the nonmonotonic shape of the concession curve introduces irrational behaviour to agents when concession curves are expected to be monotonic. In a single-issue bargaining situation rational partners could withdraw from negotiation when the opponent tries to increase its utility values over time by making concessions smaller than 0. By introducing a→b ) in the case of the seller this behaviour can be avoided. In our example (a) the concession curve would then become linear for a longer time period which could also increase the risk of a withdrawal as a rational Agents could reason that the partner already reached its reservation value (and the current offer is outside of the acceptance range). In example (b) in Figure 1 the buyer agent uses the same mixed strategy as in example (a) whereas the seller applies now a pure behaviour-dependent tactic. As both parties apply imitative tactics to some degree, introduced non-monotonic behaviour by one agent is repeated recursively so that both curves result in a cyclic shape. We can apply above simple Max-or Min-constraints to prevent this scenario (in this paper we refer to the constrained mixing mechanism as type 1C).
Mixing based on individual behaviourdependent negotiation thread
In order to calculate the imitative tactic in the previous mixing method the last offer of the mixed strategy in the current negotiation thread is used. The imitative part of the strategy does therefore not represent a true pure behaviour tactic. Another intuitive method would be to use last offers of an independent imitative negotiation thread XB tn a↔b as if we had employed the pure imitative tactic only. To achieve this, offers from the imitative functions have to be stored in order to be used in the calculation of next proposals. This mixing mechanism can be therefore denoted as: Figure 2 (a) illustrates an example for this mixing type. Curve (1) depicts seller's concession curve, (2) the pure time-dependent tactic and (4) the pure behaviour-dependent respectively. (3) is the resulting mixed strategy for the buyer, so that (1) and (3) represent the current negotiation thread X tn a↔b and (1) and (4) the thread XB tn a↔b for the imitative tactic. However, the behaviour-dependent thread still Figure 2 shows the concession curves when the buyer chooses the pure imitative tactic only and the seller applying the same strategy as in example (a). As we can see this results in a completely different negotiation thread (Curve (1) and (3)) which now represents also the pure behaviour-dependent thread (Curve (1) and (4)). Since the seller responds to the last offers from our current negotiation thread, the pure behaviourdependent thread XB tn a↔b resulting from (2) is illusory and we can not be sure if it could really exist. This seems also counterintuitive from the viewpoint of creating mixed strategies out of individual tactics. Nevertheless, this mechanism produces monotonic and smooth concession curves without the unexpected behaviour from the previous mixing method (we refer to this mix type in this paper as type 2).
Mixing based on concessions
This type uses individually calculated next concessions to mix the two different groups of tactics:
For t = 0 this mix type can not be applied as first concessions are observable only after the first round of exchanged offers. Because of that first offers are generated by any of the other types. The abovementioned equation can be extended to any number of time or imitative tactics. The interpretation of this mechanism is as follows: Presuming we had chosen a pure time-dependent tactic, τ time (t n−1 ) would be our last offer and τ time (t n+1 ) the next offer where the difference represents our next concession. For the behaviour-dependent tactic we can not follow the same line of reasoning as our last offer is unknown if we had chosen a pure behaviour-dependent tactic (as described for mix type 2). Instead, presuming we changed to full imitative tactic at time t n+1 our last offer would still be x tn−1 a→b and therefore the next offer is given by τ beh (X tn a↔b ) using the current negotiation thread with the difference representing the behaviour-dependent concession. This approach provides monotonic and smooth mixed curves such as mix type 2 while providing a reasonable technique without using non-existing negotiation threads presented with the second mix type. The following section discusses the experimental environment and the results found.
Experiments
In order to evaluate presented mixing mechanisms experiments have been carried out to enable performance measurement and discussion about their drawbacks and benefits. All mechanisms (including the constrained type) are tested with pure time and imitative tactics, and with mixed strategies using the same type of mechanism. All tactics used are presented in [4] . Throughout the experiments we assume that the seller proposes the first offer. For timedependent tactics we use polynomial and exponential decision functions with κ = 0.01 and β-values in three ranges of concession types. In order to provide approximately even distributions for both functions different sets of β-values are applied. In the case of imitative tactics we consider relative tft and absolute tft without randomness and δ = 1. Starting times are set to t=4 and t=5 for seller and buyer respectively with initial tactics being boulware time-dependent (polynomial β = 0.8). Weights for our mixed strategies are assumed to be static. Table 1 summaries all possible settings for pure and mixed strategies. Similar to [1] we use sim- The sets of all possible strategies can now be denoted as the Cartesian product of abovementioned sets: ST = {P, E}×(C ∪L∪B)×{a, r}×(S∪M ∪L) where the pure tactics represent subsets for weights 0 or 1. To facilitate strategy identification we use the initial letters for particular groups, e.g. P CaS = {P } × C × {a} × S. Results are presented via the average intrinsic utility based on linear scoring function [5] from the viewpoint of the buyer agent. The notation '*' indicates that all types or ranges for a particular value category are used for calculation. To provide a reasonable comparison between all mixing mechanisms we include the agreement rate as well. Figure 3 illustrates results found in our experiments where mixed strategies are run against pure time-dependent tactics and against mixed strategies using the same mixing mechanism. Diagrams for the opponent using pure imitative tactics are omitted since the average values differ only slightly from 3 (c) and (d). Each group of bars represent one strategy group, where from the left (light) to the right The similarity between the first two mechanisms seems reasonable as they differ only in the application of the min-or max-constraint described in section 3 to prevent non-monotonic behaviour, which does not occur in all scenarios. Even though mix type 2 and 3 differ in how they mix tactics the similarity seems also reasonable since both types propose next offers based on individual calculation of next offers or concessions of single tactics. Figure 3 shows that the average intrinsic utility is higher for mix type 2 and 3 in all presented strategy groups. Agreement rates Figure 4 : Results for strategy group 'P*a*' are higher for mix type 1 and 1C when relative tft tactic is applied, especially in the case of the seller using imitative or mixed tactics. On the other hand when absolute tft is used in the buyer's strategy mix type 2 and 3 achieve on average higher agreement rates for different deadlines whereas they are similar in the case of same deadlines. Figure 4 (a) and (b) illustrate results for the particular strategy group 'P*a*' (buyer) as an example, where the opponent employs pure time-dependent tactics and deadlines of partners differ. We can see that the first two mechanisms perform better in terms of utility when boulware tactics are used in the mix whereas the last two methods achieve higher utilities for conceder tactics. In both cases this comes to the price of lower agreement rates, even though mix type 2 and 3 achieve more successful negotiations in this example.
Results

Related Work
A large number of negotiation scenarios have been studied to provide effective negotiation protocols, mechanisms and strategies. Based on the model introduced by [5, 4] different evaluation strategies have been provided while many concentrate on single families of tactics. For example, Fatima et al [6] investigates different scenarios where agents can have partial information about partners in order to find optimal strategies which most exploit the opponent. The focus, however, is on the effect of time, information states and discounting factors on the outcome while comparisons are made to equilibrium solutions [7] . The provided results give a clear overview about exploitation possibilities in various environments but are limited to the use of time-dependent tactics. Faratin presents evaluation results for pure, static and dynamic (mixed) strategies in [4] , where the influence of long and short term deadlines as well as initial offers are shown. Results illustrate that dynamic and static mixed strategies perform better than pure tactics in terms of intrinsic utility and negotiation cycles. Matos et al [8] used an evolutionary approach by applying genetic algorithms to determine most successful strategies and how they evolve depending on the environment and chosen strategy of the opponent. They could demonstrate as well that a mix of tactics can gain advantage over single ones. The aim was to assess operational benefits and drawbacks of a number of negotiation strategies and not to investigate how they are actually combined. A number of researchers adopted combined tactics for evaluation purposes in experiments such as Cardoso et al [3] and Brzostowski et al [1, 2] . Both use strategies being mixtures of different tactic families to assess adaptive strategies employed by the agents, where the former uses reinforcement learning and the latter heuristic predictive methods or regression analysis. However, as the focus was on negotiation outcomes the mixing mechanism was not explored in terms of resulting concession curves. The work presented in this paper is different in the sense that it focuses on the mechanism itself and explores new methods compared to the generally used linear weighted combination of tactics in the case of time and behaviour dependency.
Conclusions and Future Work
This paper studies the creation of negotiation strategies by using different mechanisms to mix pure tactics. It shows that the first method, based on the linear weighted combination of tactics, exposes non-monotonic behaviour in some scenarios where time-dependent and imitative tactics are used. This introduces irrational behaviour to agents in single-issue negotiations which can be avoided by applying the presented simple constraint to this method. The paper also proposes two further mechanisms for creating strategies. The experiments show that these two methods achieve on average higher utilities for most strategy groups but at the same time increase the risk of failing the negotiation in some scenarios. As future work we propose to investigate more specific scenarios with particular strategies to explore boundaries and performance of the presented mechanisms.
